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THE SPAGHETTI BOWL REVISITED IN THE CONTEXT OF
CORRUPTION: UNDERSTANDING HOW CORRUPT COUNTRIES
COULD SUBVERT THE

WTO's RULE-ORIENTED SYSTEM THROUGH

PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
PAUL SARLO*
I am still convinced that it is in the national interest of every trading nation to
abide by the rules, which were accepted as valid for good times and bad. One of
the major benefits of international [trade] is that [it] offer[s] equal opportunities
and require[s] ....[t]hose who believe in the open trading system . . . [to] correct
those rigidities in their economic and social systems which obstruct ...economic
growth ....I
Bribery and corruption have become a scourge on international trade. [They
have] literally become an epidemic ....[They
have] a deleterious effect on trade
2
and create[] unfair and unbalanced situations.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Coined by Professor Jagdish Bhagwati of Columbia University, the term
"spaghetti bowl"3 refers to the proliferation of free trade agreements-the nearly
two hundred regional and bilateral trade agreements that exist today and that
comprise a "maze of free-trade areas . .. and customs unions . . .."4 Sanctioned
under the World Trade Organization ("WTO") Charter, in particular under Article
XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), free trade
agreements arise when "countries extend [their] preferences in different
directions." 5 In more direct terms, countries engage a particular country or region
with which they would like to trade, at the exclusion of all other countries or
regions. Free trade agreements are, therefore, also known as "preferential trade
*

LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center J.D., Stetson University College of Law; B.A.,

Vanderbilt University.
I. Press Release, Address by Arthur Dunkel, GATT Director-General at "Ostasiatisches
Liebesmahl," GATT/1312 at 7 (Mar. 5, 1982) (alteration in original).
2. The Future of U.S. Trade Policy: Perspectivesfrom Former U.S. Trade Representatives:
Hearing before U.S. S. Comm. on Fin., 110 Cong. 17 (2008) [hereinafter Future of U.S. Trade Policy]
(statement by Mickey Kantor, Former U.S. Trade Rep. and Sec'y of Com.) (alteration in original).
3. JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI & ANNE 0. KRUEGER, U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation Free Trade
Areas, in THE DANGEROUS DRIFT TO PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 1,2 (1995).
4. Caroline Freund, Third-Country Effects of Regional Trade Agreements, in PREFERENTIAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS 40, 40 (Kyle W. Bagwell & Petros C.

Mavroidis eds., 2011); MATTHIAS HERDEGEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 191

(2013).
5. BHAGWATI & KRUEGER, supranote 3, at 2.
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Because these agreements depend on national
agreements" ("PTAs").
preferences, 6 the reasons countries enter into them are not always clear-one
country's motivation for seeking a PTA may be different from another's. The
WTO Charter does not require countries to disclose their rationales for entering
into a PTA. In fact, the lone condition tied to a PTA is that it must liberalize
substantially all the trade between 8the constituent territories, 7 meaning that it must
account for the bulk of their trade.
While many scholars have considered the theory, consequences, and positives
and negatives of PTAs, 9 few have addressed the reasons why countries pursue
them and why they pick the partners they do.10 Indeed, authors of recent literature
on PTAs implicitly assume that these agreements are similar.'" But in today's age,2
when culture, goods, and money "cross borders more than at any time in history," 1
PTAs are more likely to be some of the most diverse instruments in the world,
rather than near facsimiles of each other. To be sure, the majority of them vary not
only in content but also in form, reflecting "sharp differences in the objectives of
the countries seeking them."' 3 These objectives include increased market access,
the implementation of domestic policy reform, the creation of leverage in bilateral
or multilateral bargaining power, and the formation of strategic linkages, some of
which may be related to national security.' 4 But this list is hardly exhaustive,
considering the profound differences in national institutions, economic conditions,
and socioeconomic backgrounds around the world.
This Article proposes that some countries could have far more nefarious
objectives in their pursuit of PTAs-corruption-and that corrupt schemes
involving PTAs could threaten the rule-oriented infrastructure of the WTO and the
6. Professor Bhagwati writes "[flree trade areas are inherently preferential" and "[e]conomists
interested in the quality of public discourse should perhaps take a pledge henceforth to rename free
trade areas as 'preferential' trade areas." Id. (emphasis in original).
7. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXIV, Oct. 30, 1947, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33
at
available
GATT]
[hereinafter
(1994)
1153
1.L.M.
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf; see also HERDEGEN, supra note 4, at 191
(discussing the scope of preferential trade agreements).
8. HERDEGEN, supra note 4, at 191.
9. JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY, & ALAN 0. SYKES, JR., THE LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 540 (6th ed. 2013); see also BHAGWATI & KRUEGER, supra
note 3, at 3-18 (highlighting the problems with preferential trade agreements).
10. JACKSON, DAVEY, & SYKES, supra note 9, at 540.
11. John Whalley, Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?, in THE
REGIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 63, 63 (Jeffrey A. Frankel ed., 1998), available at

http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7820.pdf.
LONDON,
STUDIES
LEGAL
TRANSNATIONAL
FOR
12. CENTER
http://ctls.georgetown.edu/about.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2013) (statement by Professor David Luban,
Georgetown Law); but see World Economy:_The Gated Globe, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 2013, at 23,
available at http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21587384-forward-march-globalisationhas-paused-financial-crisis-giving-way ("After two decades in which people, capital and goods were
moving ever more freely across borders, walls have been going up .... Governments increasingly pick
and choose whom they trade with .....
13. Whalley, supranote 11, at 70.
14. Id. at 71-73.
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efficacy of the WTO as a free-market force. The term "corruption" is an
amorphous one, encompassing a range of behaviors and activities, 15so this Article
defines it broadly as "the misuse of public power for private gain." 16 While
scholars have agreed that corruption creates an "awkward disruption of trade," an
interference with the laws of free trade and liberal expansion, they have not
identified the ways in which the WTO's rule-oriented system is vulnerable to
corrupt schemes. 17 Because corruption can undermine international trade, an
understanding of how it could infiltrate and operate within the WTO's ruleoriented system is the first step toward stopping it. The purpose of this Article
therefore is to build that understanding and to argue that PTAs could serve as the
launching pad for corrupt practices among WTO Members, particularly among the
developing countries where corruption has long been rife. This Article does not
address whether the WTO should serve as an international watchdog of corruption,
adopt rules for the curtailment of corruption, or enforce those rules-propositions
to which scholars have already devoted ample attention. 18

15. See, e.g., Kate Gillespie & Gwenn Okruhlik, The Political Dimensions of Corruption
Cleanups: A Framework for Analysis, 24 COMP. POL. 77, 77 (1991) (discussing the debate among
scholars who seek to define "corruption"); see also SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY
IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 4 (1978) (describing the multitude of activities that fall within the ambits of
corruption); What is Corruption?, BUs. ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL, http://www.business-anti-

corruption.com/about/what-is-corruption.aspx (last visited Sept. 15, 2014) ("Although there are several
conventions dealing with corruption and bribery, there is no single globally accepted definition of
corruption and bribery."); a definition of corruption appears in no piece of U.S. legislation.
16. Kevin E. Davis, Does the Globalization of Anti-CorruptionLaw Help Developing Countries?,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, GLOBALIZATION, AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 283, 284 (Julio
Faundez & Celine Tan eds., 2010) (NYU Ctr. for L., Econ. and Org., Working Paper No. 09-52)
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1520553. See also Stefan Voigt, When Are Judges Likely to Be
Corrupt?, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 24, 24 (Diana Rodriguez & Linda Ehrichs eds., 2007).
Corruption does of course flourish in the private sector too, but this Article focuses on corruption in the
public sector because governments are heavily involved in the creation of PTAs. See generally Philip
M. Nichols, Corruption in the World Trade Organization: Discerning the Limits of the World Trade
Organization'sAuthority, 28 N.Y.U. J. OF INT'L L. & POL'Y. 711, 758 (1996) (noting that bribery is
prevalent in the private sector). See also FRANK VOGL, WAGING WAR ON CORRUPTION: INSIDE THE
MOVEMENT FIGHTING THE ABUSE OF POWER 12 (2012) ("Corruption of course exists beyond the

realms of public officials. Corrupt practices of diverse kinds are pursued solely among diverse
enterprises, without involvement of public officials, and do have severe consequences. My concern in
this book, however, centers on the abuse of governmental power ...").
17. ABDULHAY SAYED, CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 13 (2004) (citing Fredrik Galtung, Corruption: The Achilles Heel of Development, in LA
CORRUPTION L'ENVERS DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 259, 270 (Marco Borghi & Patrice Meyer-Bische

eds., 1995)); Nichols, supra note 16, at 712 ("Transnational bribery directly-and negatively-affects
trade .. ").See also Futureof U.S. Trade Policy, supra note 2, at17 ("Bribery and corruption have
become a scourge on international trade. It has literally become an epidemic .... [it] has a deleterious
effect on trade and creates unfair and unbalanced situations.").
18. See, e.g., Nichols, supra note 16, at 768-84 (arguing "the World Trade Organization is the
entity that could best provide international coordination of efforts to control transnational bribery.").
See also Philip M. Nichols, Outlawing Transnational Bribery through the World Trade Organization,
28 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUs. 305, 378-80 (1997) (calling for the WTO to require its
Members to adopt
measures against corruption); Padideh Ala'i, The WTO and the Anti-Corruption Movement, 6 Loy. U.
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Part I1 of this Article describes the transnational anti-corruption regime and
identifies how corruption is a detriment to trade from a theoretical and an empirical
perspective. Part III presents the ways in which PTAs are susceptible to corruption
and contends that the manipulation of PTAs could compromise the WTO's ruleoriented system. To make this case, this Part uses Dr. Robert Klitgaard's famous
metaphorical formula for corruption and argues that PTAs in the hands of corrupt
countries can embody all the variables that make a business transaction or an
agreement vulnerable to corrupt practices: (1) monopoly power, (2) discretion by
officials, and (3) lack of accountability. 1 9 Part IV concludes that corruption could
play a part in the pursuit of PTAs by infamously corrupt countries, and may have
been doing so for years.

II. BACKGROUND: AND OVERVIEW OF TRANSNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION
REGIME AND THE DETRIMENT OF CORRUPTION ON TRADE
This Part traces the historical events that have prompted the development of
today's transnational anti-corruption regime. It then describes the WTO's lack of
involvement to date in this regime. Assessing the effect of corruption on trade, this
Part next assembles a list of the most corrupt WTO Members, and identifies how
corruption among WTO Members disrupts trade, stunts economic growth, and
threatens the welfare of society, both in theoretical and empirical terms.
A.

The TransnationalAnti-Corruption Regime

In the 1970s, the Watergate scandal brought legislative developments in anticorruption to the fore in the U.S. Investigations uncovered evidence that many
U.S. companies had made illicit contributions to President Nixon's committee for
reelection and used offshore subsidiaries to hide their payments.20 These proceeds,
however, were a mere fraction of the bribes that hundreds of American companies
had paid to foreign officials to secure business abroad. 2' In response to these
companies' efforts to obtain business abroad through bribery, President Carter
signed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") 22 into law. 23 By the late
1990s, European leaders began to recognize corruption as a wide-scale problem

OF CHI. INT'L L. REV., 259, 278 (2008) (concluding "Ithe WTO can be most effective in combating
corruption indirectly through its many provisions that mandate transparency").
19. ROBERT KLITGAARD, RONALD MACLEAN-ABAROA, & H. LINDSEY PARRIS, CORRUPT CITIES:
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CURE AND PREVENTION 25-26 (2000).

20. VOGL, supra note 16, at 161.

21. Id. "The SEC found that over four hundred other companies had paid hundreds of millions of
dollars inbribes to foreign officials to gain business advantages." THE CRIMINAL DIVISION OF THE U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE & ENFORCEMENT DIV., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE

at
available
3
(2012),
ACT
PRACTICES
CORRUPT
FOREIGN
http://www.justice.gov/cfiminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf.
22. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff (2012) [hereinafter FCPA Articles].
Backed by civil and criminal penalties, the FCPA prohibits U.S. companies from making corrupt
payments to foreign officials to secure or retain business. Id.
23. VOGL, supranote 16, at 159.
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from which their countries were not immune. 24 "A tidal wave of... corruption
[swept] across the Eurasian landmass, threatening to overwhelm the region's...
market[s] ....2 Indeed, a third of Italy's legislators had become the subject of
anti-corruption investigations 27at one point. 26 The pervasiveness of corruption
extended to other regions, too.
To curb abuses of power, members of the international community
collaborated to usher in an anti-corruption regime, 28 under which the most
prominent measures against corruption are the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions ("OECD Convention") and the
U.N. Convention Against Corruption ("UNCAC"). 29

Each convention requires

countries to enact laws similar to the FCPA, including criminal penalties for the
bribery of foreign officials. 30 The majority of WTO Members has signed and
ratified the U.N. Convention, though only some have ratified the OECD
Convention. 3' The efficacy of these conventions and the anti-corruption regime as
a whole depends on whether countries enforce their anti-corruption laws-only
four of the forty-one parties to the OECD Convention actively enforced their anticorruption laws in the past year. 32 Along with the enforcement of anti-corruption
24. Davis, supranote 16, at 283, 287.
25. Ariel Cohen, Crime Without Punishment, 6 J. Democracy 34, 34 (1995).
26. David Nelken, The Judges and Political Corruption in Italy, 23 J.L. & Soc'Y 95, 97 (1996).
27. Third-world countries, or economies that are in transition, are often replete with corruption.
See Nichols, supra note 16, at 760, 773.
28. See Davis, supra note 16, at 287 (describing the anti-corruption regime as a "mass
movement").
29. See id. at 283, 287 (describing the OECD Convention as the "first and most notable success"
of the international anti-corruption movement and the U.N. Convention as the "culminat[ion]" of the
movement).
30. U.N. Convention Against Corruption, art. 16, In 1-2, Dec. 9, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41 (entered
into
force
Dec.
14,
2005)
[hereinafter
U.N.
Convention]
available
at
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf;
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, art. 1,11111-4, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 1.L.M.
1 (1998) (entered into force Feb. 15, 1999) [hereinafter OECD Convention] available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBriberyENG.pdf.
31. Only 41 states are signatories on the OECD convention, contrasted with the 160 WTO
Members and the 140 signatories to the UN convention. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
Understanding
the
WTO:
Members
and
Observers,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis e/tif e/org6_e.htm (last visited Sep. 16, 2014); ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions: Ratification Status as of 21 May 2014,
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGBRatificationStatus.pdf (last visited Sep. 16, 2014); UNDOC,
United Nations Convention against Corruption Signature and Ratification Status as of 5 September
2014, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (last visited Sep. 16, 2014).
32. FRITZ HEIMANN ET AL., EXPORTING CORRUPTION, PROGRESS REPORT 2013: ASSESSING
ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING FOREIGN BRIBERY 5 (2013), available at

http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/exportingcorruption progressreport 2013_assessingenf
orcement of the oecd (finding enforcement remains "robust" in Germany, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the U.S.).
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laws, the discouragement of business with highly corrupt countries is a principle
objective of parties in the anti-corruption regime. 33 Governments therefore may
take to cutting off trade to corrupt countries, with the hope that "economic
of isolation ...
incentive created by the threat
34

will encourage corrupt states to take

steps to reduce corruption."
B.

The WTO and Anti-Corruption

Although a host of international organizations have united to curb
corruption, 35 the WTO is not one of them, despite the disruptive effect that
corruption has on trade. 36 Some scholars have suggested the WTO's Agreement
on Government Procurement ("GPA") falls under the panoply of the anticorruption movement, 37 but this agreement is geared toward only a few industrial
countries, 38 not the developing nations that are rank with corruption. In addition,
while the WTO has primed "the further elimination . .. of measures distorting
international competition" as an issue for future rounds of negotiations, corruption
appears unlikely to be within the scope of these discussions. 39 Despite the WTO's
hands-off approach toward corruption, some scholars have argued that the WTO is
the international organization most capable of reining in corruption:
[WTO] membership encompasses most of the world's trade. It also can facilitate
enforcement of its requirements. Those two facts, combined with the almost fifty
years of institutional experience in international commercial regulation that it
inherits from the GATT qualify the World Trade Organization as the entity that
could best . . . [provide international coordination of efforts to] control

transnational bribery.40

33. See Davis, supranote 16, at 293 ("many aspects of the transnational anti-corruption regime..

discourage firms from doing business.., with corrupt [countries]").
34. Id.
35. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund, for example, are among the international
organizations that have contributed to the "mass movement" against corruption. Id. at 287.
36. See, e.g., SAYED, supra note 16, at 13 (describing the "awkward disruption of trade" for which
corruption is responsible).
37. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 16, at 287.
38. JACKSON, DAVEY, & SYKES, supra note 9, at 241. As of 2014, the parties to the GPA are
Armenia, Canada, the 28 member states of the European Union, Hong Kong, China, Iceland, Israel,
Japan, Republic of Korea, Liechtenstein, Netherlands on behalf of Aruba, Norway, Singapore,
Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, and the United States. See also WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
Accessions,
and
Parties,
Observers
Procurement,
on
Government
Agreement

hup://www.wto.org/english/tratope/gproce/memobs-e.htm.
39. HERDEGEN, supra note 4, at 176 (noting the negotiations following the Doha Declaration
pertaining to international competition are most likely to focus on export subsidies for agricultural
products and electronic commerce).
40. Nichols, note 16, at 783. See also Ala'i, supra note 18, at 259-60 ("[Flrom the perspective of
the . . .anti-corruption movement, the WTO . . . provides a comparatively successful forum for ...

good governance ... such as transparency."); Nichols, supra note 18, at 378 (calling for the WTO to
require its Members to adopt anti-corruption measures).
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Even while arguing that the WTO should espouse the anti-corruption regime,
one scholar warns, however, that the WTO is without the power or the resources to
"solve all of the world's woes, nor should it try. " 4 1 The fact that the WTO is
only
"an infant organization, and ...will be asked to deal with so many of the world's
problems, should lead to caution in the selection of what issues the Organization
42
chooses to address.,
C.

The Adverse Effects of Corruptionon Trade

Many of the developing countries that hold membership in the WTO are
notorious for being the most corrupt in the world. According to Transparency
International, ninety-seven of the WTO's 159 members, over sixty percent, have
"serious" levels of corruption. 43 Transparency International ranks the levels of
public-sector corruption in countries by using a Corruption Perceptions Index
("CPI"), a measurement that ranges from a scale of zero to one hundred, with zero
being the most corrupt.44 The table below lists some of the WTO's most corrupt
Members.45
RANK
I

WTO MEMBER
Myanmar

CP1
15

2

Burundi

19

2

Chad

19

2

Haiti

19

2

Venezuela

19

3

Zimbabwe

20

4

Democratic Republic of Congo

21

5

Taj ikistan

22

5

Cambodia

22

41. Nichols, supra note 16, at 713.
42. Id. at 713-14.
43. Transparency Int'l, Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, http://www.transparency.org/
cpi2012/results (last visited Sept. 16, 2014) (finding a "serious corruption problem" when a country
scores less than 50 on the Corruption Perceptions Index).
44. Id.
45. This table uses the 2012 CPI listed for each country on Transparency International's website.
Tajikistan is the newest Member of the WTO, having acceded in March 2013. Myanmar, the most
corrupt country in the table, became a Member in January 1995. See Understandingthe WTO, supra
note 31.
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Angola

22

6

Guinea

24

7

Paraguay

25

8

Papua New Guinea

25

8

Guinea-Bissau

25

9

Ukraine

26

9

Congo Republic

26

9

Central African Republic

25

9

Cameroon

26

9

Bangladesh

26

10

Pakistan

27

10

Nigeria

27

10

Nepal

27

10

Kenya

27

10

Azerbaijan

27

The prevalence of corruption among WTO Members disrupts trade from both
a theoretical perspective and an empirical perspective.
D.

The Disruption of Tradefrom a Theoretical Perspective

From a theoretical perspective-a multi-disciplinary view that combines
economic theory, social theory, ethics, and law to determine what comprises the
problem of corruption in international trade-corruption is virulent to trade
because it undermines its function as a medium for expansion and growth.46 The
purpose of trade is the exchange of goods and services between producers and
traders based on competition, 47 which is healthy because it creates the incentive to
produce high-quality products and reduce prices. 48 In a corrupt country, however,
producers and traders make decisions based not on competition but on the

46. SAYED, supra note 17.
47. Id. at 13.

48. Id.
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superiority of the bribe. 49 Rather than sparking competition for quality products,
trade sinks into "a contest for the highest bribe-payer to get a governmental order,
[an] . . . 'underground auction' among bidders." 50 In short, corruption bastardizes
the decision-making process by which producers and traders choose goods and
services.51

Because of the poor quality of imported goods that countries receive under
corrupt public-procurement contracts, citizens become victims of the open-trading
52

system rather than beneficiaries. They are robbed of the "equal opportunities"
that the system is supposed to provide to them under the WTO Charter: "Ministers
affirm that the establishment of the [WTO] reflect[s] the widespread desire to
operate in a fairer

. . .

multilateral trading system for the benefit and welfare of

their peoples."53 In addition, because the bribes that corrupt governments pay to
secure public contracts-contracts for trade or any other purpose-tend to be
55
54
expensive, the cost of public services increases, and the taxpayer bears this cost.

Those who disrupt trade through corrupt schemes therefore do so at the expense of
society, which suffers "privation,"
or the pain that results from not possessing
56
certain types of pleasures.
E.

The Disruptionof Tradefrom an EmpiricalPerspective

Among the WTO Members that have serious levels of corruption, or low
CPIs, the privation of society often manifests itself as penury. In Nigeria-a
nation that has one of the lowest CPIs in the world and that has been a Member of
the WTO since the WTO's inception-the corruption that underlies the country's
most significant trading industries has left its citizens in destitution. 57 The world's
eighth largest exporter of oil, Nigeria has earned more than $400 billion from oil in
recent decades. 58 But the wealth that Nigeria has derived from its oil has gone to

49. Nichols, supra note 16, at 772 (citing FRITZ F. HEIMANN, SHOULD FOREIGN BRIBERY BE A
CRIME 9 (1994); Mark B. Bader & Bill Shaw, Amendment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 627, 627 (1983)).
50. SAYED, supra note 17, at 15 (citing Karen Mills, Corruption and Other Illegality in the
Formation and Performance of Contracts and in the Conduct ofArbitration Relating Thereto, 5 INT'L
ARB. L. REV. 126, 127 (2002)).

51. Nichols, supra note 16, at 769.
52. Dunkel, supra note 1, at 7.
53. Marrakesh Declaration Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154.
54. SAYED,supra note 17, at 15 (citing Galtung. Corruption: The Achilles Heel of Development,

supra note 18, at 265).
55. Id. at 14-15; see also Transparency Int'l, supra note 43 (describing corruption as a "dirty tax"
on the poor and vulnerable).
56. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 37
(1780).
57. Despite a GDP estimated at US$502 billion, approximately 62% of Nigerian citizens live in
extreme poverty. See CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, Nigeria, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-

world-factbook/geos/ni.html (last accessed Sep. 16, 2014).
58. PETER MAASS, CRUDE WORLD: THE VIOLENT TWILIGHT OF OIL 55 (2009).
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one percent of its population. 59 Ninety percent of its citizens live on less than two
60
dollars a day and twenty percent of children die before their fifth birthday.
Peculated by the country's "presidents, generals, executives, middlemen,
accountants, bureaucrats, [and] policeman," Nigeria's riches from its oil exports
have been lost to a corrupt government, whose perverse use of trade flouts the
WTO Charter and has transformed "a once healthy country, and the people who
6
live[] there, into a specimen of rot." '
III.

SUBVERTING THE

WTO's

RULE-ORIENTED SYSTEM:

PTAs AS

INSTRUMENTS

OF CORRUPTION
62

Many have hailed the rule-oriented system of the WTO as its crown jewel.
One author lauds this rule-oriented system because it continued to function well
even during the crucible of the financial crisis, while the financial system tottered
on the brink of ruin: "The confidence that this set of rules can withstand even
exogenous shock like a financial crisis must be seen as the ultimate validation of
the role that rules can play.", 63 But the world was not without regulatory rules that
governed the financial sector in the years that preceded the crisis-financial
institutions simply managed to subvert them in underhanded ways. 64 Like these
financial institutions, corrupt WTO Members can surely uncover ways to
contravene the rules that apply to them, if doing so would result in greater profits.
and regulations, particularly those under
Indeed, corruption loves complex rules
65
which officials have ample discretion.

This Part contends that the WTO's rule-oriented system is subject to
circumvention through corrupt practices. It begins by drawing parallels between

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 54-55.
62. See, e.g., R. Michael Gadbaw,

Systemic Regulation of Global Trade and Finance: A Tale of
Two Systems, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 551, 569-70 (2010); see also JACKSON, DAVEY, & SYKES, supra note
9, at 540 ("Some have suggested that [the WTO's rule-oriented structure] is the most significant result
of the Uruguay Round, and that it is part of a series of circumstances ... that may be the most profound
change in international economic institutions since the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944.").
63. Gadbaw, supra note 62, at 568.
64. In the years leading up to the financial crisis, the largest investment banks convinced the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to relax its oversight and permit them to take on greater
debt, during a fifty-five-minute meeting at the SEC; mortgage lenders managed to switch regulators so
that they could come under the supervision of agencies that received funds from banks; and Freddie
Mac and Fannie Mae spent millions to lobby members of Congress in exchange for slack capitalreserve requirements. Daniel Kaufmann, Corrnptionand the Global FinancialCrisis, FORBES (Jan. 27,

http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/27/corruption-financial-crisis-business2009),
corruption09_0127corruption.html. See also INSIDE JOB (Sony Pictures Classics Oct. 8, 2010)
(providing a narration of each of these occurrences in greater detail). The financial sector also managed
to convince Congress to repeal the U.S. Banking Act of 1933, popularly known as the Glass-Steagall
Act, which limited affiliations between commercial and investment banks. See generally, e.g.,
CHARLES H. FERGUSON, PREDATOR NATION: CORPORATE CRIMINALS, POLITICAL CORRUPTION, AND

THE HIJACKING OF AMERICA 44, 48, 52, 118, 152, 249 (2012).
65. KLITGAARD, MACLEAN-ABAROA, & PARRIS, supranote 19, at 26.
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the characteristics that underlie corrupt transactions and those that underlie PTAs.
Using Dr. Robert Klitgaard's famous heuristic formula for corruption, this Part
then argues that PTAs-as conduits for corrupt purposes-can embody all the
variables of a corrupt scheme: (1) monopoly power, (2) discretion by officials, and
66
(3) lack of accountability.
A.

The Characteristicsof CorruptSchemes

Corruption is difficult to detect and fight because it often occurs in the context
of a free-market transaction; that is, the parties involved in the bribe enter into a
personal exchange or bargain. 67 Because of the free-market nature of corrupt
activities, their victims suffer no immediate harm-unlike with other crimes, like
extortion, for example-and therefore no incentive exists for anyone to report
wrongdoing. 68 The premise of the bribe or transaction itself is the transfer of a
benefit to a government official 69 in exchange for "some form of preferential
treatment. 7 According to Dr. Robert Klitgaard, a formula that summarizes a
corrupt transaction is: C = M + D - A, in which the variables C, M, D, and A stand
for "corruption,"
"monopoly power,". "discretion
by officials,"
and
"accountability," respectively. 7
B.

How the Characteristicsof CorruptSchemes Pertainto PTAs

In principle, PTAs are vulnerable to corrupt schemes because they themselves
are free-market transactions; they can and do occur behind closed doors and far
from the eyes and ears of multilateral negotiators. 72 Parties can also easily
manipulate them into a corrupt exchange because they are "inherently
preferential, 73 and by definition, "some form of preferential treatment" lies at the

66. Id. at 25-26.
67. Daniel Schneider, Assistant Professor, Am. Univ. School of Int'l Serv., Lecture at Am. Univ.
Washington Coll. of Law: Doing Business in the U.S.: The Legal Anti-Corruption Framework (June 24,

2013).
68. Id.
69. Although bribery does of course occur in the private sector, this Article focuses on bribery in
the public sector because governments are heavily involved in the creation of PTAs. See generally
Nichols, supra note 16, at 758 (noting bribery is prevalent in the private sector).
70. Id. at 757.
71. KLITGAARD, MACLEAN-ABAROA, & PARRIS, supra note 19, at 26-27. In addition to these
variables, the equation can contain the variable "T," which accounts for the lack of transparency that
often accompanies corrupt practices: C = M + D - T - A. See id. at 32.
72. Cf SAYED, supra note 17, at 13 (asserting countries involved in multilateral trade negotiations
"have far more bargaining power" because they negotiate together rather than individually). In
comparison to the comatose-like state of the Doha Round, however, the high turnout of PTAs over the
past several decades indicates that bilateral negotiations constitute a more efficacious and expeditious
form of free-market bargaining. See Hyeran Jo & Hyun Namgung, Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in
Preferential Trade Agreements: Democracy, Boilerplates, and the MultilateralTrade Regime, 56 J. OF

CONFLICT RESOL. 1041, 1042 (2012) (noting PTAs "have increased dramatically in the past several
decades").
73. See Jagdish

Bhagwati,

The

WTO's Agenda: Environmental and Labour Standards,

Competition Policy and the Question ofRegionalism 2 (Columbia U., Discussion Paper No. 725, Apr.
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heart of every corrupt transaction.74 In fact, countries that enter into PTAs
routinely agree to transfer a benefit in exchange for preferential treatment: a
country exports a particular good to another country in return for more moderate75
tariffs, which are cheaper than the tariffs that non-preferred countries must pay.
While the number of countries-if any-that have based their PTAs on corrupt
schemes is a matter of pure speculation, these agreements nevertheless are
inherently prone to manipulation, the full extent of which requires an analysis
under Dr. Klitgaard's formula.
PTAs and Monopoly Power: Corrupt Conglomerates
76
Although the reasons why countries enter into PTAs are not always clear,
these agreements nevertheless have certain characteristics and effects that could
entice countries to enter into them: they lower the barriers to trade for their
members and raise the barriers to trade for nonmembers-resulting in not only
preferential treatment of members but also discriminatory treatment of
nonmembers. 77 For governments that participate in the transnational anticorruption regime, they may have commitments against associating with corrupt
countries, 78 based on which they would have an incentive to shun relations in trade
with them. In other words, governments that adhere to the anti-corruption regime
may have policy reasons to exclude highly corrupt countries from their PTAsmost likely in the hope that the "economic incentive created by the threat of
C.

economic isolation . . . will encourage corrupt states to take steps to reduce
' 79
corruption.

at
available
1995)
htp://academiccommons.columbia.edu/download/fedoracontent/download/ac: 100120/CONTENT/eco
n_9495_725.pdf.
74. Nichols, supra note 16, at 757 (describing the features of a corrupt transaction).
75. Professor John H. Jackson and his colleagues describe this dynamic well in the context of the
North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"); "[S]uppose that prior to NAFTA, the United
States imports significant quantities of winter vegetables from Mexico because Mexico produces them
efficiently and transport costs are low. After NAFTA, tariffs on these goods fall, and imports [from
Mexico] rise. . . . Mexico [now] enjoys preferential access to the United States and is able to
outcompete [non-preferred countries] for that reason." JACKSON, DAVEY, & SYKES, supra note 9, at
536. See also Bhagwati, supranote 71, at 32 ("trade barriers are lowered for members [of PTAs]").
76. See, e.g., Whalley, supra note 11,at 70-74 (describing the different reasons that can compel
countries to pursue PTAs).
77. Bhagwati, supra note 73, at 32.
78. See Nancy Dunne, Kantor Calls for Bribery Action, FIN. TIMES (London), July 26, 1996, at 3.
("The commerce secretary said that business leaders he had met say corruption in international trade is
their number one concern."). Cf Davis, supra note 16, at 303 ("There is ...evidence bearing on the
claim that the anti-corruption regime will .. .discourag[e] . . .business in or with corrupt states.");
(Nov.
1,
2010),
Corrupt
Countries,
FORBES
Fisher,
The
Most
Daniel
http://www.forbes.com/2010/I 1/01/most-currupt-countries-2010-business-beltway-curruptcountries slide 3.html (noting the U.S. prohibits investment in Myanmar because of its high levels of
corruption).
79. Davis, supranote 16, at 293.
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In a possible move to counteract discriminatory treatment by anti-corruptionoriented countries infamously corrupt countries may have resorted to forging PTAs
among themselves-erecting corrupt conglomerates, or affiliations among the
most corrupt countries in the world that constitute monopolies.8" The definition of
a monopoly is a complex on, but in the context of international trade a monopoly
could constitute the combination of two or more countries with the power to
control market prices and engage in exclusionary behavior. 81 Some PTAs in
existence today exclude most countries that are active in the anti-corruption regime
and that have respectable rankings in Transparency International's Corruption
Perception Index. One illustration, among a legion of others, 82 is the Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa ("COMESA"),83 which consists of twentyone nations and twenty WTO Members. 8485 The table below lists the COMESA's
members along with their respective CPIs.
Rank
COMESA Member
I
Sudan
2
Burundi
3
Zimbabwe
4
The Democratic Republic of Congo
4
Libya
5
Angola
6
Eritrea
7
Kenya
8
Comoros
9
Uganda
10
Egypt
10
Madagascar
11
Ethiopia
12
Djibouti
13
Malawi
13
Swaziland
13
Zambia

CPI
13
19
20
21
21
22
25
27
28
29
32
32
33
36
37
37
37

80. For the purpose of this paper, a "corrupt conglomerate" constitutes two or more countries in a
PTA that combine for an average CPI below fifty.
81. 117 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE PROOF OF FACTS 391, §49 (3ded. 2010).
82. To view a list of the dizzying array of PTAs in existence today, and the corrupt conglomerates
among them, see Global Preferential Trade Agreements Database, THE WORLD BANK,
http://wits.worldbank.org/gptad/library.aspx (last visited Sept. 13, 2014).
83. Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Nov. 5, 1993, 2314
U.N.T.S. 265 [hereinafter COMESA].
84. South Sudan, which is a member of COMESA, is not included in the table because it does not
have a CPI on Transparency International's website. It is, however, one of the most corrupt nations in
the world. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 78.
85. This table uses the CPI listed for each country on Transparency International's website. See
Transparency Int'l, supra note 43.
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Seychelles
Rwanda
Mauritius

52
53
57

The average CPI among these nations is thirty-two-an abysmally low
number. On paper, perhaps only a few other affiliations in the world bring the
term "corruption" to mind as instantaneously as the affiliations that comprise the
COMESA. Some of those other affiliations, regrettably, come from other PTAs
under which a cadre of similarly corrupt countries has united. 86 In addition to their
abilities to exclude undesirable countries from their agreements, these
conglomerates often induce unfair market prices for non-members because
corruption results in higher tariffs and non-tariff barriers. 87 With their power to
participate in exclusionary behavior and to inflate market prices, these
conglomerates have the very characteristics of monopoly-like entities.
D.

PTAs and Discretion by Officials: The Folly of Choice ofLaw Provisions

Because PTAs are free-market transactions, they allow notoriously corrupt
governments not only to enter into them but also to have authority to arrange their
very terms. As members of the WTO, these governments have carte blanche to
create any agreement they like within the framework of the WTO-a $500 billion
industry at their fingertips. 88 They even have license to craft their PTAs so that
they can sidestep the WTO's rule-oriented system, placing themselves under the
auspices of their own laws instead.89 In other words, they are free to devise their
own mechanisms for enforcement, 90 which allow them to resolve their disputes
under so-called PTA law, not under the supervision of the WTO's disputesettlement system-the "real teeth" of the WTO. 9 ' This type of freedom invites
86. Supra note 82.
87. Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Suryadipta Roy, Corruption and Trade Protection: Evidence
from Panel Data 2-3 (Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis, Research Div., Working Paper No. 2007-022A,
2007), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2007/2007-022.pdf (citing YOUNG LEE & OMAR
AZFAR, DOES CORRUPTION DELAY TRADE REFORM? (2002)); see also Future of U.S. Trade Policy,

supra note 2, at 17 (a statement by Mickey Kantor asserting corruption "creates unfair and unbalanced
situations [in trade]").
88. See generally Nichols, supra note 16, at 714-15 (noting membership allows a country to
participate in "a regime that will increase global income by as much as five hundred billion dollars").
89. See Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994 art. XXIV:6, 1112, Apr. 1, 1994, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 55
at
XXIVI
available
of
Art.
Understanding
194
[hereinafter
U.N.T.S.
Settlement
Dispute
"the
(providing
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/10-24.pdf
Understanding may be invoked with respect to any matters arising from the application of those
provisions of Article XXIV relating to [PTAs]") (emphasis added).
90. JACKSON, DAVEY, & SYKES, supra note 9, at 556.
91. Nichols, supra note 16, at 737; see also JACKSON, DAVEY, & SYKES, supra note 9, at 283
(noting Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement contains the WTO's dispute-settlement rules); Gadbaw, supra
note 62, at 569 (describing Article XXIII of the GATT as the source of recourse for a WTO Member
whose benefits have been nullified or impaired, "whether by a violation of the agreement, any measure,
or any other situation").
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unfettered corruption in trade because it could mean that countries with corrupt
courts will have no one to answer to for their misdeeds. "Ultimately, the success
of [national dispute resolution systems] depends on whether the courts of the
Member States are ... free from corruption," 92 which plagues the judiciaries in the
countries of far 93too many WTO Members and causes judges themselves to support
illicit practices.
94
Although the WTO does make all PTAs available for public consumption,
transparency regarding what an agreement contains is not the same as transparency
regarding what the members of an agreement actually do. 95 In recent years, for
instance, China has demonstrated how agreements involving issues of trade can
become subservient to corrupt interests. Before inviting China to accede to the
WTO in December 2011, a Working Party examined China's request to become a
WTO Member; 96 corruption in China-namely in the form of piracy, 97 or
intellectual property theft-was a concern for the Working Party:
Some members of the Working Party further urged China to ensure the vigorous
application by Chinese authorities of the enforcement legislation in order to
considerably reduce the existing high levels of copyright piracy and trademark
counterfeiting.

Action should include the closure of manufacturing facilities as

well as markets and retail shops that had been the object of administrative
convictions for infringing activities.98

In response, Chinese officials assured the Working Party that China's measures for
fighting piracy are severe:
The representative of China stated that the measures

for cracking down on

intellectual property piracy were always severe in China.

In judicial aspects,

92. DAVID A. GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 378 (2009).
93. See also Joseph Muraya, East Africa: Police, Judiciary Most Corrupt in East Africa,
ALLAFRICA (Nov. 22, 2013), http://allafrica.com/stories/201311230150.html (reporting that East
Africa's judiciary comprises some of the most corrupt public officials in the region). See generally,
e.g., Mary Noel Pepys, Corruption within the Judiciary: Causes and Remedies, GLOBAL CORRUPTION
REPORT 2007: CORRUPTION IN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 16, at 3 ("In many... countries, judicial
corruption is a systemic problem ... The judicial system may be structured to foster corruption. The
external pressures on a judge toact unethically are greater, and the risks of being caught and punished
are lower."); Brent T. Yonehara, Enter the Dragon: China's WTO Accession, Film Piracy and
Prospectsfor the Enforcement of Copyright Laws, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 389, 408 (2002) (noting
corruption in China's judiciary);
94. See Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements, 11A(2) WT/L1671 (Dec. 18,
2006) (providing "the WTO Secretariat... will post [PTAs] on the WTO website...").
95. As the clichd goes: actions speak louder than words.
96. Working Party Report, Report of the Working Party on the Accession to China,
WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Oct. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Report of the Working Party], available at
http://doesonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t]WT/ACC/CHN49.doc.
97. Piracy is a form of corruption-rather than just illegality-because it breeds the abuse of
public power, namely the willful failure of officials to enforce laws. See infra notes 102-05 (citing
sources that support the proposition that piracy is a form of corruption).
98. Report of the Working Party, supranote 96, at 60.
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courts at all levels were continuously paying attention to the trial of IPR cases. As
for administration aspects, the administrative authorities at all levels were putting
emphasis on strengthening anti-piracy work .... in a bid to ensure that the legal
environment of China would be able to meet the requirements for enforcing the
[WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS)]. 99

Days later the Ministerial Conference granted accession to China, which in return
had consented to enforce laws in protection of Trade-Related aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPS. 00
Despite China's commitment to the eradication of piracy, its piracy rate has
now reached almost ninety percent,' 0 ' and this past summer, during an
unprecedented summit with the president of China, President Obama even
"confronted [President] Xi with specific evidence of intellectual property theft the
U.S. says is coming from China."' 0 2 With its astronomical piracy rate, China is
likely in violation of TRIPS. 0 3 China's assurances to the Working Party now have
the appearance of rhetoric, which has given way to the financial boon and political
security that piracy affords to local merchants and local officials, respectively:
Local level leaders are evaluated by the economic performance of their local
political units and counterfeiting can be a boom to the local economy. The trade
in counterfeit goods can absorb large numbers of unemployed workers, generate
substantial revenues, provide tax revenues, and support other legitimate industries
such as warehouses, hotels, restaurants, and nightclubs in the local economy. 104

99. Id. at 62.
100. The Ministerial Conference, Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China,
(Nov.
23,
2001),
available
at
WT/L/432
11
2(A)(2)
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/432.doc.
101. Chun-Hsien Chen, Explaining Different Enforcement Rates of Intellectual Property in the
United States, Taiwan, and the People's Republic ofChina, 10 TUL. J. TECH.& INTELL. PROP. 211, 211
n.2 (2007) (citing Bus. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE & INT'L DATA CORP., THIRD ANNUAL BSA & IDC
STUDY
4
(2006),
available
at
GLOBAL
SOFTWARE
PIRACY

http://www.bsa.org/-/media/Files/Research%20Papers/GlobaStudy/2005/DC-Global-Software-Pirac
yStudy 2005.pdl).
102. Gillian Wong, Leak of NSA Programs Tests US, China Ties, YAHOO! NEWS (June 10, 2013),
http://news.yahoo.com/leak-nsa-programs-tests-us-china-ties-l 10817133.html. The U.S. believes that
China has engaged in phony sting operations through which the government has targeted only "minor
players," not the major manufacturers of pirated products. Alexander C. Chen, Climbing the Great
Wall: A Guide to Intellectual Property Enforcement in the People's Republic of China, 25 AIPLA Q.J.
1, 32 (1997). Even when officials do target and shut down major factories, they spring back into
business in a matter of months, or new ones appear.
103. Oliver Ting, Pirates of the Orient: China, Film Piracy, and Hollywood, 14 VILL. SPORTS &
399, 408 nn.40-41 (2007) (explaining why China is in violation of its TRIPS agreement)
ENT. L.J.
(citing INT'L INTELLECTUAL

PROP.

ALLIANCE,

COPYRIGHT

ENFORCEMENT UNDER

THE

TRIPS

AGREEMENT 3-4 (2004), available at http://www.iipa.com/rbi/2004_Octl 9 TRIPS.pdf).
104. DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN A

NUTSHELL 446 (Thomson Reuters, 2d ed. 2009) (2003).
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Even the judiciary is not immune from the corrupt influence of piracy.
Because local officials have the authority to "confer power and reject officials"' 5
and because judges are beholden to these local officials for funding, salaries, and
continued employment,' 0 6 they relent to pressure that the government places
on
07
them-pressure that results in their willful failure to enforce anti-piracy laws.
In large part, the central government in Beijing is responsible for the corrupt
practice of piracy in China because it has given local governments discretion to
enforce intellectual property laws as they see fit,'0 8 much like the WTO gives
countries discretion to negotiate and enforce their PTAs as they see fit." 9 The
countries, for example, that are parties to the Southern Common Market
("MERCOSUR") Agreement-Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay-have
used their discretion to adopt a "system for the settlement of disputes .... ,10
Their judiciaries, however, are so corrupt that they have undermined procedural
processes that are essential to the resolution of disputes among the MERCOSUR's
members."'

The MERCOSUR is "one of the most

. . .

important regional trade

agreements ever concluded,"'"12 but its members will not have harmony in their
dispute resolution systems if their courts remain corrupt.'13

105. Yonehara, supra note 93, at 415 n.217 (citing Julia Cheng, China's Copyright System: Rising
to the Spirit of TRIPS Requires an Internal Focus and WTO Membership, 21 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J.
1941, 1986 (1998)).
106. Id. at 408 ("[J]udges [can] have strong personal ties with their local communities.... [and]
[l]ocal enforcement authorities are usually beholden to the same local officials who control the purse
strings to their offices and are allowing the piracy to continue.") (citing Scott J. Palmer, An Identity
Crisis: Regime Legitimacy and the Politics of Intellectual Property Rights in China, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 449, 465-66 (2001)).
107. See generally CHOW, supra note 104, at 448 ("judges may be beholden to the local
governments that appointed and may face pressures to protect the local trade in counterfeit and pirated
goods"); Amanda S. Reid, Enforcement ofIntellectual Property Rights in Developing Countries: China
as a Case Study, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 63, 93 n. 182 (2003) (citing KLITGAARD,
MACLEAN-ABAROA, & PARRIS, supra note 19, at 40).
108. Yonehara, supra note 93, at 415 n.216 (citing Cheng, supra note 105, at 1985-986).
109. See BHAGWATI & KRUEGER, supra note 3, at 2 (describing PTAs as inherently preferential
instruments-meaning that governments have the discretion to choose the countries with which they
would like to pursue agreements); see also GATT, supra note 7, at art. XXIV, 8 (stating countries that
pursue PTAs need only concern themselves with one restrictive precondition: PTAs must liberalize
"substantially all the trade between the constituent territories"); Understanding of Art. XXIV, supra
note 89, at art. XXIV:6,1I 12 (providing "the Dispute Settlement Understanding may be invoked with
respect to any matters arising from the application of those provisions of Article XXIV relating to
[PTAs]") (emphasis added); JACKSON, DAVEY, & SYKES, supra note 9, at 556 (noting members of a
PTA are free to devise their own mechanisms for enforcement).
110. Treaty Establishing A Common Market Between The Argentine Republic, The Federative
Republic Of Brazil, The Republic Of Paraguay and The Eastern Republic Of Uruguay, Mar. 26, 1991,
30 I.L.M. 1041 [hereinafter MERCOSUR].
111. GANTZ, supra note 92,365-378.
112. Id. at 365.
113. Id. at 378.
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PTAs and Lack ofAccountability: No Heed to the Possibility of
Corruption

Although no uniform definition of the term "accountability" exists in the
literature or lexicons that address corruption, a strong indication of accountability,
or the lack thereof, is the type of company that a person chooses to keep-or for
WTO Members, the countries with which they do business. 1 4 Indeed, under the
FCPA," 5 which has become a model for nations that have sought to enact anticorruption laws," 16 parties must perform due diligence on partners with which they
engage in business, or else risk complicity for their corrupt activities. 117 Based on
the FCPA's standards, the accountability of WTO Members that enter into PTAs is
dubious because some of the PTAs in existence are conglomerates of the most
corrupt countries in the world. In addition, PTAs among corrupt conglomerates
lack provisions that address corruption," 8 whereas countries on the frontline of the

114. "Do not be misled: '[blad company corrupts good character."' 1 Corinthians 15:33 (New Int'l
Version). In similar terms, Julio Rojas, CEO Standard Chartered Bank in the Americas, once said
"[wlho you choose not to do business with sends a very strong message about corruption." THE
WORLD BANK GROUP & INTEGRITY VICE PRESIDENCY, ANNUAL REPORT: FINDING THE RIGHT
Rojas),
(quoting
Julio
in
original)
16
(2012)
(emphasis
BALANCE
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTDOII/Resources/WBGIntegrityReport2Ol2.pdf.
115. FCPA Articles, supra note 22.
116. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Dealing with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
4, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/04/dealing-with-the-foreign-corrupt-practices-act/?_r-0.
117. FCPA Articles, supra note 22, at § 78dd-2(a); THE CRIMINAL DIVISION OF THE U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE ENFORCEMENT DIVISION OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, supra note 21, at 60.

118. Compare COMESA, supra note 83 (containing no anti-corruption provisions), and
MERCOSUR, supra note 110 (containing no anti-corruption provisions) with United States-Morocco
Free Trade Agreement art. 18.5(l)-(5), June 15, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544 available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fia/morocco/asset-upload-file939 3855.pdf
(containing comprehensive provisions against corruption). The anti-corruption provisions under Article
18.5 of the United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement state:
ARTICLE 18.5: ANTI-CORRUPTION
I. The Parties reaffirm their continuing resolve to eliminate bribery and corruption in international
trade and investment.
2. Each Party shall adopt or maintain the necessary legislative or other measures to establish that it is
a criminal offense under its law, in matters affecting international trade or investment, for:
(a) a public official of the Party or a person who performs public functions for the Party intentionally
to solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any article of monetary value or other benefit, such as a
favor, promise, or advantage, for himself or for another person, in exchange for any act or omission in
the performance of his public functions;
(b) any person subject to the jurisdiction of the Party intentionally to offer or grant, directly or
indirectly, to a public official of the Party or a person who performs public functions for the Party any
article of monetary value or other benefit, such as a favor, promise, or advantage, for himself or for
another person, in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his public functions;
(c) any person subject to the jurisdiction of the Party intentionally to offer, promise, or give any
undue pecuniary or other advantage, directly or indirectly, to a foreign official, for that official or for
another person, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of
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anti-corruption regime have long ago recognized the need to expand the coverage
of trade agreements to cover issues relating to corruption."1 9 Many PTAs among
corrupt conglomerates also do not mandate that national tribunals or panels must
publish their decisions-a lack of transparency that is typically a red flag for
corruption and invites corruption in judiciaries. 2 ° For the countries that have
formed corrupt conglomerates through PTAs, even the suggestion that they are
unaware they have made bedfellows with historically corrupt partners is naive; a
more realistic view is that they are aware but have no fear they could be
investigated or held accountable by the WTO.
IV.

CONCLUSION AND SOLUTION

The spaghetti bowl of PTAs is complex not only because of the many strands
within it but also because of the countless reasons that countries form these
strands. Although PTAs serve legitimate interests of parties in international trade,
they may also serve illegitimate interests because they are instruments that are
vulnerable to corruption. Parties can arrange PTAs so they take on all the
variables in Dr. Klitgaard's formula: monopoly power, discretion by officials, and
lack of accountability. These agreements therefore could be attractive to corrupt
governments that seek to perpetrate corrupt schemes involving the vast network of
countries in the WTO, but beyond the WTO's oversight. Indeed, corrupt practices
could very well be playing some role in the formation of PTAs between countries
today, and may have been doing so for years. Although the variables in Dr.
Klitgaard's formula do not equate to a smoking gun, they probably are tantamount
to a preponderance of the evidence: if a business transaction or agreement
embodies the three variables, then corruption is more likely than not to exist.

official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of
international business; and
(d) any person subject to the jurisdiction of the Party to aid or abet, or to conspire in, the commission
of any of the offenses described in subparagraphs (a) through (c).
3. Each Party shall make the commission of an offense described in paragraph 2 liable to sanctions
that take into account the gravity of the offense.
4. Each Party shall strive to adopt or maintain appropriate measures to protect persons who, in good
faith, report acts of bribery described in paragraph 2.
5. The Parties recognize the importance of regional and multilateral initiatives to eliminate bribery
and corruption in international trade and investment. The Parties shall work jointly to encourage and
support appropriate initiatives in relevant international fora.
United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement art. 18.5(l)-(5), June 15, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544 available
at

http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/morocco/asset upload-file939-3855.pdf
119. Trade Protection and Enforcement: Hearing before the H. Appropriations. Comm., Subcomm.

on Commerce, Justice, State, & the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (May 8, 1996) ("We aim to expand the
coverage of trade agreements to address . . . bribery and corruption.") (statement by Charlene
Barshefsky, Former U.S. Trade Rep.).
120. See Voigt, supra note 16, at 297 ("If judicial decisions, as well as the underlying reasoning,
need to be published, expected corruption levels are lower.").
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While anti-corruption has yet to come to the fore of the WTO's agenda, the
WTO has the power to restrain corruption that thrives under PTAs. The most
obvious step that the WTO can take to thwart corruption is the negotiation of a
multilateral agreement against corruption, one that carries the consequence of
retaliatory measures under the GATT. The negotiation of multilateral agreements
among the WTO's Members, however, is likely to be too idealistic in light of the
Doha Round's failure, which may now signal that multilateralism is a bygone era
in the WTO. 12 1 A more practical solution may simply require the WTO to become
vocal regarding the ill effects of corruption on trade and the relationship between
PTAs and corruption. In past years, the WTO has used its flagship publication,
World Trade Report, to report on issues that are on the vanguard of international
trade-like the effect that trade can have on the world's water resources-but
22
regarding which the WTO has neither specific agreements nor rules. 1
The WTO can and should issue a report on the effects of corruption on trade
and provide insights regarding how PTAs can become breeding grounds for
corruption. On a broad level, the report must urge members of the WTO to ratify,
implement, and-most importantly-enforce the UNCAC and the OECD
Convention through their domestic legal systems. With regard to PTAs in
particular, the report should encourage Members to incorporate anti-corruption
provisions into these agreements, provisions that not only contain commitments
against corruption but also require arbitral tribunals to apply rules of law from
countries with strong anti-corruption statutes. While the report would not equate
to a promulgation of anti-corruption rules or agreements within the WTO's
framework, it would place pressure in the form of public shame on Members to
implement appropriate anti-corruption measures in the context of trade-a
common tactic behind the enforcement of today's anti-corruption conventions. 123

121. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, Doha Round: Failure of Talks Means World Lost Gains that a
ECON.
TIMES
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2012),
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Treaty
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Brought,
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-06-0 l/news/3 1959341 1_ptas-wto-multilateral-trade
("The Doha Round, the latest phase of multilateral trade negotiations, failed in November 2011, after 10
years of talks, despite official efforts by many countries, including the UK and Germany, and by nearly
all eminent trade scholars today.")
122. WTO SECRETARIAT, WORLD TRADE REPORT 2010: TRADE IN NATURAL RESOURCES 3-5

(2010) available at http:/www .wto.org/english/res e/bookspe/anrepe/world-trade_ reportlOe.pdf
("Natural resources tend to be concentrated in relatively few locations around the world. This makes
for profitable trading opportunities among nations. At the same time, because natural resources are so
crucial to many economic activities, adequate access to them is regarded as a vital national interest
everywhere. Those who possess natural resources may not always wish to trade them, but rather to
harness them domestically .... [S]upply or demand for natural resources ... can become a source of
political tension.").
123. See, e.g., The OECD WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE
AFRICA
5-76
(2014), available at
OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN SOUTH

http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/SouthAfricaPhase3ReportEN.pdf (providing a scathing review of
South Africa's compliance with the OECD Convention).

